So I’ve been thinking about when someone is justified to owning something, and this is my thought process (sorry if this is not the intended use of this community):
Imagine a person who finds a rock on the ground, when he picks it up & uses it to hurt another person they are morally culpable. Comparably, that same person has a body & if they use that body to hurt someone, they are morally culpable as well. It’s hard to say that people don’t own their body, as in they have the moral right to keep & use something (the body), since it’s an extension of their consciousness. How & when someone owns something is important, since the right of property is seen as a fundamental right & is the bedrock of our capitalist society. So using something we fundamentally agree is something that someone owns, we can to understand why & apply it to other things. When comparing these two examples, we’ll understand that what makes ownership exist is if it is used as a tool. Simply because the ownership of the body can be compared to an ownership of an item, which is especially explicit in a moral example in isolation.
Let’s say there’s someone named Elthri, and they will painlessly separate the arm of someone named Kral — which Kral does not want, however would be extremely useful for Elthri to use. This is to avoid other variables, such consequentialist thought of net harm; we’ll treat this as a net-zero in positive or negative outcomes. Everyone agrees, unless someone prescribes to an esoteric philosophy, that Elthri does not have any moral right to take away Kral’s arm for one reason: he has ownership of that arm; it’s his arm. The reason it’s his arm is that it’s connected to his consciousness, it’s a part of his moral weight — it’s an extension of his consciousness. That’s the same reason we can prescribe moral weight to his body, it’s an extension of his consciousness — if not that means if he punches someone he cannot be morally culpable. Since a disagreement of this premise necessarily means his hand hitting someone is not connected to his consciousness, meaning they are not morally capable. Him, as a person, cannot be blamed.
Items work the same way: when someone picks up a rock & hits someone with it, they are still morally culpable. The rock becomes an extension of the person’s consciousness. The only real difference is that the body gives sensory details to our experience, while we can only externally feel the rock. However, in the scenario Elthri & Kral scenario pain (or senses in general) is not the reason for why Elthri cannot keep Kral’s arm — meaning we must conclude that the extension to our consciousness is the actual reason something becomes owned. Kral owns his arm because it’s an extension of him, the same way a rock can be.
However, when does something become an extension of another person is still a standing question. Hurting someone is an obvious example, since there is moral weight, it’s easy to see the extension, but in the input, process, or result of hurting someone when does it become owned? The only answer is that it’s used as a tool, our body is inherently a tool because we must necessarily use it.
A rock is used, it becomes a tool, which means it becomes owned. In the rock-hurting example, it cannot be the outcome (as in hurting someone) in of itself, since someone can have a body but never have a moral outcome in a vacuum but still own their body. It cannot be the person’s effect on the rock, since a person who cannot feel, move, essentially cannot affect their body still owns it. However, the use of the body as a vessel means it is used meaning it’s a tool, meaning it’s explainable through tool-ownership.
I coin this as thinking as tool-ownership, unless it’s already an established philosophy that already has a name. Which is, in a vacuum, the use of a thing as a tool means the person owns the thing.
You do realize you’re asking me: can people never use anything in a way where it’s evident they used something (meaning everyone shares) - or everything clear who owns what (one person owns all if not most of everthing)? You had made a dichotomy where the assumption is that it’s not possible some parts of our physical world can be owned by multiple people while other things only owned by one. It also assumes that one person can somehow use most resources in the world. That is obviously impossible. Maybe in interconnected group like societies, but not an individual. However societies necessarily share ownership to some degree.
I never said that was a definition, that was an answer to your question about who has the moral right to own something. If one country colonizes the other, assuming that the colonized were first to use the land, the colonized own the land. However, if the colonizers successfully colonize they are wearing the skin of a dead person - they don’t own the skin since it was a illigimate overtake of ownership. If another country tries to take ownership of the land it isn’t an immoral action since it was never legitimate. If they succeed they own the land. However, just because the country owns the land, how the land is used makes the ownership come to question. I would argue that in a feudal country the king takes ownership, and as you probably know, the king usually uses that ownership in a immoral way. Making their ownership illegitimate. Essentially: “whoever owns the thing under tool-ownership - except x, y, z.” I think I explained it in the second or third paragraph of how it’s applicable to human bodies in my last response.
Your last paragraph I’ve already responded to in my first paragraph, though indirectly.
I will repeat: Your definition of “moral ownership” boils down to “owning something morally”. You rely on an existing (and in every case so far, implicit and subjective) definition of morality. When there are conflicts between your definition and your subjective morality, you defer to subjective morality. What’s the point of the definition then?
I will repeat: What is the point of your definition?
What is the point of musing about tool use?
What problem does it solve?
What solution does it offer that isn’t just your subjective moral opinion covered in obfuscating layers of philosophy?
Please answer each of these questions, directly, specifically, in order. Unless you do so there is no benefit to the conversation
Sorry if I seem weasly, I thought I was actually engaging.
Direct Answer: The point of my definition is to find the most moral way to define ownership.
Clarification: I acknowledge there are different philosophies that disagree with my ethical framework. However, I used what most people agree with: the right to have ownership over one’s own body. Then I extrapolated from that to the definition of ownership. Unless you disagree people don’t have ownership over their own body, then I think we share a value that allows you to agree with the tool-ownership thought. That’s why I have been using body metaphors.
Direct Answer: It solves some problems, like how the most ethical conclusion is to share unknown ownership between people. I am sure there are other examples like that.
Direct Answer: My philosophy is my subjective morality, I never said anything that would contradict that. At least not on purpose.
Clarification: Even though I do believe my morality is subjective I can recognize the popular moral opinions of the general person. That’s why I appeal to popular opinion & something that’s seemingly fundamental, like the ownership of one’s own body.
I feel there still is a misunderstanding. I do not disagree with ownership of one’s body. I feel it is exactly your extrapolation which is questionable. I will number my points, and implore you to number your responses to coordinate each point to its rebuttal:
-
You posit a definition of moral ownership. You define that, initially, as: being the first to “use” the object in question as a “tool”, i.e. an extension of ones body. If you would like to refine that definition, succinctly, please do so.
-
If primacy is morality, “licking all the doughnuts in the box” is a valid claim to ownership. Turn the lake into concrete, chop down the forest, plant a flag in a continent. Dibs is the law. Finders keepers.
-
It doesn’t functionally matter who’s first, all that matters is who had possession the first time a “tribe”(king, state, nation, empire) started to keep records. Manifest destiny, lay claim by violence, once there’s a government to enforce ownership you can call “base” and since you’re “first” your claim is legitimate.
-
I steal your shoes. My claim of ownership is immoral. I sell your shoes. The buyer bought them fair and square, so their claim of ownership is moral.
-
If possession with intent to sell counts as “use”, where’s the line? I claim all objects not presently being used as mine, and it’s all for sale. All vacant property not presently in the market, every abandoned car, every forgotten hammer is now mine and I intend to sell it. What do you mean by “use” that logically applies to merchandise that doesn’t apply in this example?
-
It seems when you find conflicts above, you wash your hands of it by saying the actions are immoral so they don’t count. Who decides? You? Whenever there’s a conflict of interest, do we have to phone you up and get your opinion? Isn’t the whole point of a moral definition to have some objective bedrock to rely on? What is the “popular moral opinion of the general person”? This is a point of major historic contention, have you solved it definitively, or are you relying on your personal opinion to be representative of everyone?
-
Ultimately. What your ethos is pointing to is literally socialism. The workers own the means of production. That is, the people who use the tools, own the tools. All raw materials are shared, and value is explicitly based on extending one’s will to use those materials. If this is not your intention, please demonstrate logically why this interpretation is incompatible