Single-Page Application(lemmy.ml)

Well, no, not really. All HTMX really does are AJAX requests to remote resources, which are performed by interpreting attributes in HTML. You specify the type of request and the target for updating. Those requests can sometimes contain parameters, of course, but any API that accepts any kind of conditional or user generated input has to sanitize that input before doing anything meaningful with it. This requirement isn’t something particular to HTMX.

You fundamentally are invoking logic via HTML attributes, which bypasses CSP

This is not true, though. You are manipulating the DOM via HTMX, but CSP has nothing to do with dynamic content manipulation. CSP is more concerned with preventing the injection of malicious code. If what you’re referring to, however, is the possibility of someone maliciously injecting HTML with HTMX that performs some nefarious action, then I have to ask (again) why you didn’t properly sanitize user input or limit the possible connection sources in your CSP.

If you have a specific example, however, of a way in which HTMX by design violates CSP that can’t be dismissed with “you coded your website poorly,” I would love to know.

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pixxelkick@lemmy.world

-1 points

8 months ago

why you didn’t properly sanitize user input

This is like someone pointing out that blowing a giant hole in the hull of your ship causes it to take on water, and you respond by asking “well why aren’t you bailing out the water with a bucket?”

You do understand why Content Security Policy exists, and what it is for… right?

“We don’t need a watertight ship hull for the voyage, just reinvent and implement a bunch of strapping young lads that 24/7 bail water out of the ship as it sails, it’s faster and more efficient than doing something crazy like building your ship to be secure and water tight.”

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rwhitisissle@lemmy.ml

2 points

8 months ago

“Wow, these screen doors really suck. I’ve stuck them on my submarine, but they just don’t keep the water out at all. Some people are going to say that I’m a fucking moron and don’t understand the technology I use or that I’m too goddamn lazy to actually take the necessary steps to keep water out of my submarine, but I know they’re wrong and it’s the technology’s fault.”

In all seriousness, HTMX is a tool designed for a specific job. If you have an API that has either non-parameterized endpoints to hit or an endpoint that accepts a single integer value or UUID or…whatever to perform a database lookup and return stored values to be interpolated into the HTML that endpoint returns, then, great, you’ve got a lightweight tool to help do that in an SPA. If you’re using it to send complex data that will be immediately and unsafely exposed to other users, then…that’s not really what it’s for. So, I think the core issue here is that you don’t really understand the use case and are opposed to it because to use it in a way that is beyond or outside the scope of its established convention is unsafe without extra work involved to guarantee said safety. It also implies you are running a website with a content security policy that either explicitly allows the execution of unsafe inline scripts or which does not care about the sources to which a script connects, which is the only way you could realistically leverage HTMX for malicious ends. So, ultimately, the choice to not adopt comprehensive security measures is one you are free to make, but I wouldn’t exactly go around telling people about it.

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pixxelkick@lemmy.world

-1 points

8 months ago

That’s not broad enough.

If you in any way have functionality that handles anything remotely requiring security, do not use HTMX.

This goes way beyond “parameterized endpoints”.

Listen extremely closely and pray to God anyone dev with more than 2 brain cells groks how serious th8s vulnerability is:

HTMX enables arbitrary invocation of ANY api endpoint with cookies included, through html attributes, which inherently can’t be covered by Content Security Policy

This is deeply important for any web dev worth their salt to understand.

Sanitizing User input should be your LAST layer of defence against attack vectors. Not, NOT, your first and only

It’s supposed to be your “break in case of emergency” system, not your primary (and only remaining) defense layer.

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rwhitisissle@lemmy.world

2 points

8 months ago

HTMX enables arbitrary invocation of ANY api endpoint with cookies included, through html attributes, which inherently can’t be covered by Content Security Policy

I want you to please explain how HTMX bypasses the Content Security Policy connect-src directive, or any -src directive, for that matter, assuming it is specified (which it should be). Because I’m genuinely curious why the HTMX dev team would include a section on CSP in their docs if it did literally nothing, as you say.

Actually, as an even more basic question…you do know that HTMX is literally just an AJAX library, right? It doesn’t actually “do” anything via HTML attributes. The additional HTMX attributes, like hx-get, hx-post, etc. just tells HTMX where and how to make the API requests. These requests are executed by the browser’s native fetch or XMLHttpRequest APIs, depending on compatibility and implementation. Therefore, HTMX is subject to the same security constraints and policies as any other JavaScript-based operation that makes HTTP requests. Which also, by definition, means that it adheres to the Content Security Policy directives configured for that website.

In other words, an HTML button element with hx-get=“https://www.some-endpoint.com/” on it would eventually translate into

const xhr = new XMLHttpRequest();
xhr.open("GET", "https://www.some-endpoint.com/");
xhr.send();

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