Submission Statement
The line between civilian and combatant is becoming increasingly blurred. Decentralized networks and distributed sensors mean that any individual civilian could be a lethal threat to the soldiers in their proximity. In turn, the paranoia this engenders drives soldiers to treat even ordinary civilians with suspicion and hostility, sometimes with grievous consequences. This dynamic poses a challenge for all future occupying powers, especially those without Russia’s propensity for brutality against the innocent. This article focuses on the problems Ukrainian civilian resistance has posed to Russia, but disambiguating when a collaborator becomes a valid military target remains a thorny issue that Ukraine will have to deal with as they plan on pushing into areas that Russia has occupied for close to a decade now.
This article is the fourth in a series by the Economist focused on lessons learned from the Ukraine war. The articles are written for a layman audience, but even dedicated watchers can derive value from the interviews and novel information sprinkled throughout. I plan on posting them in sequence here, and the full set of 7 articles can be found here.
Shashank Joshi is The Economist‘s defence editor. Prior to joining The Economist in 2018, he served as Senior Research Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) and Research Associate at Oxford University’s Changing Character of War Programme.
Early in the war 20 Russian fuel tankers rolled into Sedniv, a small town in Chernihiv province, north of Kyiv. “The locals called us,” says Major-General Viktor Nikolyuk, commander of Ukrainian forces in the north, “and said: what should we do?” His answer was simple: “Drain them.” Locals on horses and tractors, carrying bottles, barrels and teapots, siphoned off fuel with the cry of Slava Ukraini—glory to Ukraine. The general could hardly believe it when another round of tankers appeared shortly afterwards. Those, too, were relieved of their cargo.
Small wars are fought by a country’s armed forces. Total wars are waged by entire nations. Civilians have played a huge role in the defence of Ukraine. When Ukrposhta, Ukraine’s national postal agency, held a competition to design a stamp, the winning entry depicted a tractor towing away a captured Russian tank—one of the war’s most iconic images. When Kyiv was under threat, civilians mixed Molotov cocktails to hurl at invading armoured vehicles. Volunteers have raised money for vehicles and drones. The Serhiy Prytula Foundation, a civilian charity, even bought a satellite for the army. “Kyiv has placed cross-society resistance at the heart of its national defence,” writes Hanna Shelest of Ukrainian Prism, a think-tank.
Digitally enabled popular resistance on this scale would have been largely impossible 15 years ago. Jack McDonald of King’s College London points out that, when America invaded Afghanistan in 2001, less than 1% of the local population had access to the internet. In Syria in 2011, when a civil war was already under way and mobile-phone footage of combat became widespread, the rate was still only 22%. When Russia invaded Ukraine in 2014 it had reached 46%. When it did it again last year the figure had shot up to almost 80%. “What you’re seeing in Ukraine,” he says, “is what’s going to be standard.”
A core principle of international humanitarian law is that armed forces must discriminate between combatants and non-combatants. But if civilians are building drones, hauling military gear over the border from Poland, reporting on troop movements through apps and correcting artillery fire over video chat, do they become legitimate military targets? The Geneva Conventions lay down that civilians lose protection “for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities”. But what this means is hotly disputed.
All this presupposes that armies are making good-faith efforts to discriminate between civilians and soldiers—that they care about the laws of war. If Ukrainian civilians have so often been willing to jeopardise their status as non-combatants, it may be because Russia’s army has shown scant regard for such niceties. General Nikolyuk recalls Russian troops establishing a headquarters in a school in Yahidne, a village south of Chernihiv. Hundreds of locals were imprisoned in the basement. On another occasion in nearby Lukashivka, he says Russian soldiers, spotting a Ukrainian drone, forced women and children to walk down the street as human shields. “What do you do in such cases? You bite your fists with impotence and that’s it.”
I don’t think modern technology is radically changing the nature of civilian involvement in war. The internet has made communicating with civilians who are inclined to assist their nation’s armed forces or oppose occupiers easier, but in that sense it is simply a better radio or telephone.
(I might even argue that civilian resistance prior to the development of long-range communication is, in a way, comparable to modern civilian resistance. While the means of communication available to civilians were very limited, so were the means of communication available to soldiers - thus the relative effectiveness of civilian involvement may have been similar.)
While I do think you’re correct, “better” is doing a lot of heavy lifting there. There’s a huge difference between a civilian having to trek to a landline or radio to give an account from memory of enemy forces, versus sending an HD image with attached coordinates that gets propagated across the entire network within seconds. There’s a massive difference between a commander having access to a couple of resistance members, to literally being able to get in contact with civilians within minutes using Google Maps. Having civilians feeding you information has always been valuable, but the speed and quantity of civilian information gathering is a real sea change here.
I’m not sure we actually disagree on anything other than how big something has to be before it’s huge.
(I suppose my wording implies that I don’t think standards for the treatment of civilians in this context should be more permissive now than they were before, but that’s a matter of personal moral principles. I don’t know enough to say anything about actual international law.)
An aside: I do think modern technology has made it hugely easier for friendly soldiers and civilians to carelessly send information to the enemy, but I suppose that’s not strictly on-topic because it is not relevant to the distinction between civilians and combatants.
What do you think of the idea that if civilians are risking their lives to oppose you on their own land you are probably doing a wrong thing? Then, the protection of non-combatants should be applied very liberally. In a way this seems related to self-determination?
There are lots of situations where civilians are fighting for causes that have to be destroyed. Basically every single able-bodied civilian in Japan was mobilized towards the end of WWII. ISIS used women and mentally challenged children as suicide bombers. Were the Allies wrong to liberate France because a number of French collaborators were risking their lives to help the Nazis? There are lots of unjust wars, don’t get me wrong. But when we do go to war for a good reason, we have to be able to draw lines between civilians and combatants in order to achieve our objectives while minimizing harm. That’s why these standards exist.